Reclaiming anthropology for science

RECLAIMING ANTHROPOLOGY
FOR SCIENCE:
A LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
Dr Edward Dutton
Dr Edward Dutton lectures anthropology at Oulu University in Finland. He studied
Theology at Durham University and Anthropology of Religion at Aberdeen
University. He is the author of The Finnuit: Finnish Culture and the Religion of
Uniqueness (Akademiai Kiado, 2009) and Meeting Jesus at University: Rites of Passage
and Student Evangelicals (Ashgate, 2008). He has also written for various
newspapers, magazines and journals including the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian,
Times Higher Education, Times Educational Supplement, Chronicles, Right Now!, Salisbury
Review, Contemporary Review and Quarterly Review.
n Allia Scientific Notes No. 17
ISBN 9781856376259
ria ISSN 0267-7067 (Print)
ISSN 2040-5774 (Online)

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LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
RECLAIMING ANTHROPOLOGY FOR SCIENCE:
A LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
Dr Edward Dutton
Abstract
1920s it was becoming accepted that anthropologists should engage in fieldwork (‘participant observation’) and Scientific anthropologists tend to argue for the veracity of so produce ‘ethnographies’ (see Gellner 1995, Ch. 1). But their approach and assume that the most logical approach it has moved away from its scientific origins. From the will ultimately reclaim the discipline from postmodernists 1920s, scholars such as Margaret Mead (1928) began to and extreme-naturalists. This article advocates scientific argue that all cultures are equal, can only be understood anthropology but stresses that being logically coherent is through their own terms (cultural relativism), there is al- only part of the process of scientific revolutions. It dem- most no hereditary influence on personality (cultural de- onstrates that anthropology is broadly in the grip of those terminism) and so the anthropologist’s duty is to describe who are implicitly religious—not rational—and then pre- and preserve the culture. Cultural determinism was pulled sents a libertarian manifesto on how anthropology—in apart by Derek Freeman’s (1983) refutation of Mead’s practical terms—might be returned to the scientific fold. shoddy research in Western Samoa, which purported to show a ‘negative instance’ in terms of teenage angst. This shattering of anthropological orthodoxy—by a ‘scientific’ Introduction
outsider—plunged anthropology into crisis but, even by 1983, Mead’s form of anthropology was being criticised The aim of this research report is to look at how scientists from the postmodern perspective as well. might begin to reclaim social anthropology from the anti- positivist and especially the postmodern tradition which Accordingly, there has developed a divide in social anthro- has risen to some prominence within it. The article is, I pology between those who believe that social anthropol- fully concede, a series of suggestions and possibilities but ogy should be ultimately underpinned by science—and so I think that advancing such possibilities is useful in set- evolution—and the ‘naturalists’, who do not. American ting-off what I see as an important debate abut anthropol- anthropologist Lawrence Kuznar (1997, 176) argues that ogy’s future. The arguments advanced are suggestions but the discipline of social anthropology—even more so than they are justified because they attempt to answer a signifi- other social sciences—has been drawn away from science cant question asked—but as yet not satisfactorily an- and towards being a form of replacement religiosity. swered—by scientific anthropologists. Persuaded of the ‘Anthropology must be seen to be thoroughly rent at this veracity of scientific anthropology, ‘Where do we go from point,’ he laments, ‘with its own practitioners deconstruct- ing it in an intellectual civil war which threatens to balkan- ize, if not totally destroy, the discipline forever . . . Scien- Accordingly, this article is an exercise in practical philoso- tific anthropologists seem holed-up in defensive citadels phy. Based on the premises that anthropology should be while postmodern and critical factions have taken the field scientific—as we will discuss—in order to meaningfully and are beginning to snipe at one another’ (211). assist in developing more nuanced theories of human na- ture and that it is potentially useful in this regard, and, In his book, Reclaiming a Scientific Anthropology (Kuznar moreover, the premise that civilization is required for sci- 1997), he provides ample evidence for this summary. A ence to flourish (see Popper 1966a/b, 1963, Sandall 2001), ‘crisis of representation’ began, in social anthropology in what practical action should be taken to return anthropol- around the 1970s in which all of anthropology’s funda- mental assumptions came to be questioned and some have insisted that anthropology remains in this state of crisis (e.g. Rees 2010a). Hymes (1974) criticised anthropologists Anthropology and Science
for imposing ‘Western categories’—such as Western measurement—on those they study, arguing that this was Physical anthropology is the study of the evolutionary a form of domination. Asad (1973) criticised field-work origins of humans. To a great extent, this remains a sci- based anthropology for ultimately being indebted to colo- ence. Social—or cultural—anthropology grew out of nialism and it has been argued (e.g. Sandall 2001) that this physical anthropology in the nineteenth century. Begin- has led some anthropologists to focussing on their own ning with tribes or folk life, it attempted to record and to psychologies, and their fallibility as scientific instruments, scientifically understand what are commonly called more than their observations. Andreski (1974, 109) might ‘cultures’, often underpinned by a belief in at least partial counter that this reflects ‘methodological perfectionism’ as biological determinism. This discipline began by drawing does the essentialist1 demand that anthropological con- upon sources—‘armchair anthropology’—but by the cepts be dissected in detail to the neglect of actual analy- LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
sis.2 The instruments of physical science are also fallible a void of Nothing where we can understand nothing. It is as is a zoologist in relation to that which he observes. epistemologically pessimistic. And as Bruce (2002) argues Others drew upon the postmodern deconstruction of it makes many ideological assumptions; for example that texts to argue that anthropology was ultimately composed all cultures are equal or that colonialism is inherently of ‘texts’—ethnographies—which can be deconstructed (e.g. Marcus and Cushman 1982). By extension, as all texts—including scientific texts—could be deconstructed, Edward Wilson (1998) argues, in my view persuasively, for some anthropologists began to accept that reality itself Consilience of the various academic disciplines. In sum- was tenuous and only ‘within the text.’ Indeed, for an- mary, he maintains that knowledge is reached both by thropologists such as Wagner (1981) there is, in effect, no fragmentation—in the sense of reductionism in order to objective truth. All attempts at constructing reality are gain purchase on an object of study—but also, crucially, subjective responses to the ‘culture shock’ caused by the by reconstruction. We are witnessing an ‘ongoing frag- cultural ‘other.’ Watson (1991, 79) is explicit that there is mentation of knowledge’ (8) as we divide into innumer- no objective reality. Anthropological accounts are able subdisciplines and ‘consilence’ would consequently be positive for scholarship. Consilence is metaphysical but the ‘success’ of science provides a strong case for its Other scholars have pursued postmodern deconstruction veracity and, indeed, Kuznar (1997, Ch. 3) gives examples by questioning anthropological categories. For example, of the proven success of scientific anthropology above its Rees (2010a) is sceptical of ‘culture’ because it has a start- ing point in history, plays down nuance, is static, and im- poses a Western category on the other . . . but this is, of Wilson (1998) notes that ethics, social policy, environ- course, true of all categories of apprehension. In the mental policy and social science are clearly closely related nominalist tradition, they are to be used cautiously if they domains yet they stand apart with separate practitioners, are helpful (see Dennett 1995, 95) and to term such cate- modes of analysis, language and standards. The result is gories ‘reified’ or ‘essentialist’ is really a straw-man argu- confusion with regard to the areas of overlap yet it is here ment. Equally to suggest that the changes since the 1980s ‘where most real world problems exist’ (10). Wilson have been so radical that culture is no longer useful fails therefore argues that these specialists must, and can, reach to understand the broad anthropological definition of the an agreement on standards of abstract principles and evi- word and that, for a nominalist, words can be malleable dentiary proof. He then proceeds to prove how humanity and employed as and when useful. Some argue that and social science explanations are ultimately question- ‘representation’ and ‘theory’ are problematic (e.g. Rees begging (and, in some cases, simply ideological) and fully 2010a) but fail to appreciate that any description is inher- make sense only with ‘consilience’ into biology and psy- ently an act of representing and even language is under- chology. Wilson’s idea has been criticised with critics cit- pinned by some kind of theory (see Gentner 1982). They ing a belief that a ‘rational society’ is not the same as a may counter that understanding arrives ex nihilo, in the ‘scientific society’ but it has been countered that these break-down of fieldwork, but this seems closer to reli- critics then use ‘science’ as their ultimate model for a ra- gious understanding than scientific (see Wiebe 1999). tional society. Wilson has also been criticised for an idio- And Denis Dutton (1999) observes that other social scien- syncratic view of ‘the Enlightenment quest’ but this does tists reflect postmodern influence with scholarship that not undermine the logic of consilience (Segerstråle 2000, says very little but is verbose and makes use of intellec- tual-sounding jargon such as, in anthropology, ‘reified,’ ‘emergent,’ ‘problematised,’ ‘discontinuities’, ‘agency’ and Consilience characterizes scientific enquiry. It must be so on3 as well as fallacious arguments, such as that possible to reduce research in a particular discipline down ‘culture’ should be dismissed because it is old-fashioned or to the discipline which ultimately underpins it. This is an important sign that a discipline is scientific. ‘Science’ must also involve certain agreed characteristics. Lawrence The problems with postmodern anthropology are fairly Kuznar (1997, 22) argues that these are the following: clear as Gellner (1992) observes. Its cultural relativism is 1) It must be solely empirical. If a discipline is based on hypocritical, best summarised by Richard Dawkins (2003, unprovable or inconsistent dogmas it is not scientific 15) with the lines: ‘Show me a cultural relativist at 3000 and if it places something—such as ‘empathy for in- feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite . . . If you are flying to formants’—above the pursuit of truth it is not sci- an international conference of anthropologists . . . the reason you will probably get there, the reason you won’t 2) It must be systematic and exploratory. plummet into the ploughed field is that a lot of Western, 3) It must be logical. This means, in particular, that fal- scientifically trained engineers have got their sums right.’ lacious arguments, such as appeal ad hominem, ap- It is also inconsistent because it attempts to use the logic peal to motive or any other form of rhetoric must be of Western science to question the usefulness of logical avoided. It also means that the research and argu- reasoning itself. Its extreme essentialism—in radically deconstructing categories of apprehension—leads us to a 4) It must be theoretical, it must attempt to explain, to situation where we cannot begin to understand anything answer questions and, where possible, predict. In this so postmodernism, as Scruton (2000) puts it, takes us into regard, it engages in nominalism and only cautious LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
Goldstone 1980), whereby anthropology is brought back 5) It must be self-critical, prepared to abandon long-held into the scientific-fold. What can be done to hasten it in 6) Its propositions must be open to testing and falsifica- 7) As it wishes to be falsified and as anybody can, in How to Create a Revolution
theory, do so; science should be a public activity. 8) It should assume that reality is actually real and can be Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci diverged from understood; it should be epistemologically optimistic. Marx’s view that only if revolutionaries take hold of the Accordingly, it must accept that there is an objectively means of production and distribution can they take power correct understanding of how the world works which from the ruling class and thence take their place. Instead, the ‘ruling class’ posit a ‘hegemonic’ ideology which ‘legitimises’ their position. They then impose this ideol- Rees (2010b, 900) has defined science as ‘thoughtful, sin- ogy on the populace through their control of the cere research’ but this is so broad that it would not distin- ‘ideological state apparatus’—legal and political admini- guish science from art.4 If we accept Kuznar’s model of stration, schools, universities, churches, the media, the science and that anthropology, to be logically coherent, family and the underlying assumptions of popular culture must be part of it then it is reasonable to ask ‘Where do (Giddens 1997, 583). In general, the revolutionary wants we go from here?’ and this is how Kuznar (1997, 11) ends to bring about ‘manufactured consent’ (Gramsci 1971, 215). The revolution has been truly successful when the ideology ceases to be controversial but, instead, becomes regarded as common sense, as something that no reason- Religion, Science and Paradigms
able person would question. In such a situation, counter- revolutionaries do not—usually—need to be actively per- Kuznar accepts that social anthropology has become secuted by the state. Most citizens will regard them as at dominated by what he terms the latter-day ‘religious’— best laughable and at worst dangerous and treat them ac- those who fervently hold to inconsistent, illogical views, what Bailey (1997) terms the ‘implicitly religious’. Despite the veracity of scientific anthropology, it has been pushed So, can such a theory be applied to ‘anthropology’? With to the sidelines and, indeed, Kuznar observes that Kuhn’s many nuances, I would argue it could be. Anthropology (1963) model of scientific revolutions accepts that being (and many disciplines) is rendered far more complicated scientifically correct is only part of a successful scientific than a nation-state because it is increasingly international revolution. Once a new paradigm is widely accepted, a and beyond the control of individual nation states which form of tribalism will rear its head and there will be a reac- are, in turn, influenced by transnational forces (e.g. Becher tionary and irrational response—by those who have built and Trowler 2001). The ideological ‘apparatus’ takes the their careers on the new paradigm – to those who attempt form of peer-reviewed journals and books, conferences, to logically challenge it, as observed in the reaction to anthropology societies and anthropology departments. In Derek Freeman’s (1983, 1999) critique of Margaret Mead addition, the broader non-academic media is an important (1928) (see Freeman 1996). Andreski (1974) and many piece of the apparatus. The way in which this apparatus others (e.g. Jenkins 2009) have observed the parallels be- works, in terms of power-dynamics, has been discussed, tween scientific practice and religion. Andeski (1974, 249) more broadly, by a number of scholars (see, for example, argues that scientists should be ‘iconoclastic’—relentlessly Andreski 1974, Martin 1999 or Welch 2009) and I will tearing down that which is widely accepted in pursuit of the truth. But iconoclastic scientists soon gain a cult-like following of scientists who wish to preserve the new Anthropologists can influence whether or not dissenting status quo, ironically rejecting the very kind of iconoclastic anthropology is published through the kind of peer- scientist whom they have originally followed. reviews which they write for journals or publishers. As rhetoric-expert John Welch (2009) puts it, ‘Blind peer re- Kuznar makes various suggestions on what should be view can also be a way to abuse privilege. Someone with a done but this involves little more than repeating that an- score to settle can do so by using the blind review process thropology should be scientific. This may persuade think- punitively.’ Or, if they are journal editors, influence is ing, critical anthropologists who have only ever been ex- wielded through the ability to decide whether an article is posed to naturalist or postmodern anthropology. Kuznar peer-reviewed at all or whether, sometimes, to over-rule may have rescued anthropology intellectually but he is not the reviews and this may even done for financial reasons. being practical. Anthropology’s takeover by cultural rela- As Welch (2009) suggests, ‘Malaria is more abundant to- tivists was a kind of revolution. If Kuhn is right, it may day than it ever was, yet medical journals are more likely take a counter-revolution to return it to science. And if to publish works about Cialis or whatever other big- Kuznar (1997, 211) is correct then social anthropology is money drug funds the ads that keep that journal afloat.’ in a state of crisis induced by the postmodern critique. This ‘crisis’ is, as is widely acknowledged, the most auspi- If they are asked to write books reviews, these can be used cious circumstance for a revolution (see Kuhn 1963, as attempts to smear and sink a book with which they LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
disagree for ideological reasons. Equally, conference or- implicitly religious nature of postmodern and cultural rela- ganisers can control what kinds of papers are given at a tivist anthropology, thus inculcating the next generation conference. Scholars will be nominated as reviewers, or with scientific anthropology. Equally, anthropologists editors, because of previous publishing success in journals could use their influence in departments to strongly argue and books and, indeed, academic positions which they against the appointment of potential colleagues who seem hold, though they were may review papers only tangen- to advocate anti-scientific anthropology and employ their tially related to their area. They will in turn be appointed influence as reviewers to prevent the publication of anti- to these positions because of their publishing success and scientific anthropology literature and highlight the flaws of will, if they ascend the academic ladder, be able to control that which is published in letters to the editor, critical who else works in their department, perhaps on ideologi- book reviews (specifically requesting to review books by cal grounds if they wish. In turn, they will be more likely postmodern anthropologists) and even articles for the to be published by academic publishers if they have pub- lished in the right journals, hold an academic position and, especially in the case of a PhD thesis, been funded by a There are many possibilities for provocative articles in the prestigious funding body where funding distribution can press which could damage postmodern anthropology. itself be politically manipulated as can the process of the For example, all practicing anthropologists—or members ‘PhD Defence’ or viva voce. The distribution of funding is of anthropological societies—could be invited to a sign a another piece of apparatus which can make or break re- document from which no genuine scientist could possibly demure; stating that they accept scientific principles. Fail- ure to do so would then be publicly highlighted which Finally, a scholar is far more likely to be of interest to the would likely be damaging to the reputations of the schol- media if he has published academic books and articles and ars in question and their departments. There may be phi- holds an academic position or higher qualification, be- losophical objections to science but these are no more cause these provide him with authority rendering any con- matters for anthropologists then they are for chemists if, troversial statements he might make far more newswor- indeed, social anthropology is genuinely a science. In the thy. Media coverage will, in turn, affect his academic Sokal Hoax (see Sokal and Bricmont 1998) American physicist Alan Sokal sent a lampoon of postmodern writ- ing (Sokal 1996) to a postmodern cultural studies journal As Andreski (1974, Ch. 1) argues, a power structure is by as a test to see whether they would publish it, which they its very nature conservative. It is controlled by the domi- duly did. Similar lampoons could be sent to leading an- nant ideology and established academics and any challenge thropology journals. I suspect—and hope—that many to this ideology, or the system involved, is likely to be a would be rejected but some might not be and, if this oc- challenge to the life’s work, social position and even salary curred, media attention could be brought to this which of those in control, a point which Westbrook (2008) would accordingly pressure the journals and highlight the makes about postmodern anthropology. Accordingly, as Andreski (1974, 49) notes, the challenge may come from daring small publishers, less prestigious journals, scholars outside the discipline, popular academic writing and even The Need for a Libertarian Society
from publishers and scholars in academically peripheral But I would submit that the influence of postmodernism in anthropology is ultimately a reflection of the nature of Of course, in practice some pieces of the apparatus are far the society in which the apparatus operate. Andreski more important than others. It is reviewers, writers and (1974) observes that the dominant discourse in social sci- editors of the leading journals—and for the leading pub- ences tends to be the dominant discourse in society at lishers and the most prestigious funding bodies—who large. Though social science may influence society, in have the real power over the most important parts of the general it reflects the dominant ideology to a far greater apparatus. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to argue that extent than physical science because it is more difficult for the real centres of power are journals published in the physical sciences—with their greater degree of empirical USA and Britain and especially American Anthropologist, rigour—to be hijacked by the implicitly religious. More- Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute and related jour- over, Gellner (1996, Ch. 1) notes that the various anthro- nals. The most significant publishers might include Ox- pological disciplines have been founded on implicitly reli- ford University Press and Harvard University Press and gious ideas. Nineteenth century Western anthropology these might also be amongst the most important depart- drew upon the ‘Great Chain of Being’ to assert a racial and even religious hierarchy whereby the Northern Euro- pean was, in every way, superior. It was dominated by A counter-revolution involves advocates of scientific an- biological determinism, something which developed into a thropology taking hold of these organs of influence by dogma. Eastern anthropology developed in the context of effective use of the influence they already have. Scientific small-nation nationalism, assuming that its purpose was to anthropologists should insist on teaching their under- build a nation—accepting many elements of Romantic graduates—as part of their courses—about the philoso- nationalism—and so preserve and document its folk cul- phy of science and be quite explicit with them about the LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
Accordingly, postmodern anthropology is part of a ernment and Politics Department . . . Doubtless, broader cultural revolution where the apparatus of many students will be upset to lose their chance of power—including politically significant university depart- getting a degree . . . bearing in mind the mixture of ments that relate to how we treat and understand peo- worthless knowledge and ruling class indoctrination ple—has been taken over by those in the Gramscian tradi- from which we would be saving them, they would not tion. As such, scientific anthropologists should campaign, suffer on balance’ (Gabb 2007, 58). in all countries, for the form of government most condu- cive to science and I would submit that this would be one I would counter that lawyers are necessary in a society without a clear and lauded ‘ideology’ and so not a govern- governed by the Rule of Law and this is the form of soci- ment in the implicitly religious Romantic traditions of ety which Gabb wants as opposed to totalitarian society socialism or nationalism (see Scruton 2000) let alone ex- where the law is enforced unfairly. Also, all the depart- plicit religion. This may be a form of moderate, libertar- ments he lists can make a contribution to civilization as ian conservatism and Kuznar (1997, 22) observes that long as they are scientific and this is why I suggest that science, by its very nature, is libertarian. Nevertheless, a funding should be withdrawn on a case-by-case basis in government of this kind – motivated by a desire for free- the manner which I have advocated, though as Gabb is dom—would not only defend the interests of science but suggesting action to avoid a counter-revolution perhaps would realise that postmodernists, cultural relativists and such departments could be initially relieved of funding the like were ultimately a manifestation of the power of and the issue reassessed in less pressing times. If universi- the opposition, of the displaced ‘ruling class.’ Intelligent ties were to receive no government-funding, then social lobbying would, therefore, be far more likely to persuade science departments would be beholden to the interests of such a government that direct or indirect government- benevolent donors. I would argue that this would only funding for research should be based on the degree to make them as corruptible as if they were beholden to the which the research is actually scientific. Academics could interests of the government of the day. This is a problem, be made to justify their research—according to the criteria of course, but it must be understood in the context of the outlined—and if it were not scientific (or broadly so by benefits to science of a relatively libertarian government. contributing to a civilization conducive to scientific prac- It might be argued that if all government funding were tice)6 funding would be cut from the scholar and from the withdrawn from universities then scientific research would department until it would be financially very difficult to likely gain funding from industry and the medical profes- sion, paid for by the public, and so would continue. There would always be a need for lawyers—so the Law Moreover, any justification would have to include a sum- would gain funding from the public and could be self- mary—written in clear language—making clear the useful- sustaining. Such a situation might also see substantial ness of the research for an academic in an entirely differ- cutbacks in higher education and a rise in ‘independent ent area of study. Evidence of verbosity and jargon scholars,’ especially in history, philosophy and so on, would, accordingly, be extremely costly. whose research could not be corrupted by the desire for Libertarian philosopher Sean Gabb (2007) goes further in a broader manifesto on how to win back England from And, of course, once anthropology is returned to science a postmodernists. He delineates in detail how to destroy— counter-revolution must be prevented. Welch (2009) ar- at great speed—what he sees as the semi-totalitarian state gues for radical reform of the peer-review process such which has been constructed in England since World War that scholarship is published online and continuously up- II and especially under the New Labour Government of dated as it is constantly peer-reviewed. The form of peer- 1997 to 2010. In terms of holding society together, he review which is widely practiced, he argues, is slow, easily also implicitly argues in favour of some limited form of corruptible, reliant on a degree of good luck, most jour- ethnicity-based identity (54).7 I would argue that his nals and publishers who employ it inherently restrict ac- methods—such as abolishing almost all restrictions on cess to science (through expensive, jargon-filled publica- free speech and association, guaranteeing these as unas- tions which few people read); it is essentially a form of sailable rights and abolishing and destroying all the re- vanity publishing. Replacing this kind of peer-review un- cords of most government departments and commissions dermines the power-base of established scholars but it and generally making government insignificantly small by could only be done once the ‘revolution’ had occurred. privatising almost everything—would aid such a revolu- Prior to scientists taking control of anthropology’s major tion. However, I would nuance his attitude to education. journals, scholars would be unlikely to follow Welch’s idea He argues that once a libertarian government is elected— fearing their publications would lack impact and prestige. assuming it can be elected—all government funding As in my own case, they may also fear that they will not be read by other scholars and so fail to contribute to the de- bate or receive feedback allowing their ideas to be cri- ‘. . . we should cut off all state-funding to the univer- tiqued and further developed. Accordingly, to introduce sities. We might allow some separate, transitional such an idea anthropologists would have to take over and support for a few science departments. But we should be careful not to allow another penny of sup- port for an Economics or Law or Sociology or Gov- LI BERTARI AN AL LI ANCE
But the problem is that—for the scheme to work—there But, of course, it is tentative and I would welcome the would have to be some degree of ‘authority’ involved, suggestions of other scientific anthropologists on how it such as that potential reviewers have PhDs (the provision might be developed. Perhaps one of the obvious prob- of which is corruptible) or books published and that those lems is whether such action is in the spirit of caution and that run the new system be respected experts. And schol- self-criticism which underpins critical rationalism. Can ars will desire a way to sift through all the dross and aca- scientists be sufficiently ‘sure’ to ‘act’ in such a decisive demic books and journals provide such a means, if not a perfect means, of doing this. They gain prestige by virtue of the calibre and influence of the people published in or by them and the extent and nature of their readership. Perhaps this can be achieved by an initial insistence that any submitted article, no matter how bad, is anonymously (1) For Essentialists it is the task of science to describe the reviewed in the traditional fashion by two or three recog- true nature of things and thus focus on the definitions of nised scholars, the suggestions at least responded to,8 re- terms. Nominalists are more interested in understanding reviewed and further responded to before publication how something behaves in different circumstances and which then occurs even if the reviews are broadly nega- they make use of a concept if it is helpful. tive. Once published, all scholars are invited to read it and (2) As we will see below, this can be a useful means of anonymously send reviews continuously. Following suppressing dissident research. A peer-reviewer can sim- Welch’s vision, it might be difficult to find the best schol- ply insist that a category that has been criticised by post- arship other than through a system whereby it was ‘liked’ modernists (such as ‘culture’) must be ‘problematised’ in or cited by eminent scholars, which would not be that so much depth that there is no space—in the word limit dissimilar to what occurs now. However, the system of an article—to engage in actual analysis, forcing the would make it far more difficult to abuse peer-review (by scholar to either give-up on the article or the category using it to prevent publication for ideological reasons) and would render a counter-revolution far more difficult. (3) Interview with Denis Dutton (2010) with reference to (4) This is a rejoinder to Dutton (2010). More than just ‘good luck’
(5) For example, Gellner was a philosopher before turning to anthropology. Malinowski and Andreski were both Kuznar (1997, 224) ends his defence of scientific anthro- from Poland but challenged British anthropology and so- pology thus: ‘Anthropology should centre and orchestrate around a principle theme, the quest for understanding the (6) For a discussion of the necessity of civilization to sci- human condition using scientific principles, yet be tolerant of the discordance that will, in the end, make it rich and (7) A number of scholars (e.g. Salter 2006) have argued meaningful. I wish the best of luck to us all.’ I partly that some kind of hallowed worldview is required to hold agree with Kuznar and admire his positive attitude and civilization together in the face of those who would bring magnanimousness. But he also seems to reflect the kind it down and the idea of a genetic extended family, and of implicit religiosity which I have highlighted. Tolerating passing on one’s genes, is a prime motivator in any animal ‘discordance’ (by which he means postmodern anthropol- including humans. This form, in effect, of ancestor- ogy, creation science and other shoddy research) may ‘in worship avoids stifling intellectual dissent—as in when the end, make it rich and meaningful’—in that it forces society is held together with dogmas (see Benoist 2004)— scientists to be more self-aware and hone the expression but I appreciate there are difficulties with it. of their arguments—but it may sink anthropology and (8) Of course, there is room for corruption here because science more broadly because some postmoderns are the editor could insist that they have not responded even openly opposed to science. So Kuznar’s assertion smacks if they have so strict guidelines on what constitutes a of bien pensant prophecy. And while anthropologists may ‘response’ would have to be drawn up and mutually ac- need auspicious coincidences, wishing us ‘the best of luck’ doesn’t really help unless you believe in the genuine power Bibliography
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